

BOOK REVIEWS

Chandra Bose to Nihon. By JOYCE C. LEBRA.
Translated by Horie Yoshitaka. Forward
by Fujiwara Iwaichi. Tokyo: Hara Shobo,
1968. iv, 323 pp. Notes, photographs.
Y, 1,700.00

The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asian countries during the Great East Asian War was a cataclysmic experience for indigenous peoples. Japan's wartime slogan "Asia for the Asiatics," embodied in the concept of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, bolstered incipient nationalist fervor in Southeast Asia and gave its leaders confidence in challenging the political control of the Western powers. In recent years Western scholars of Asian affairs have attempted to reevaluate the meaning of Japan's Great East Asian Co-Prosperity—a task made possible by the increasing availability of wartime documents which have been scattered in archives and in private possession. The book under review—a study of wartime Japanese-Indian cooperation and its significance for India—utilized such materials, supplemented by the author's interviews with former Japanese and Indian military and civilian officials involved in the alliance. In preparing the book, Professor Lebra researched at the Netaji Research Bureau in Calcutta, the archives of the Indian Government and of the Defense Ministry in New Delhi, the archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and of the Japanese Self Defense Agency, the Japanese National Diet Library, and the Keio University Library in Tokyo. As a result, the author has produced the first comprehensive monograph, to the reviewer's knowledge, that deals with the subject in depth.

This book analyzes the formation, development, and tragic end of the wartime Japanese-Indian alliance capped by the death of Suhbas Chandra Bose, leader of the India National Army (INA), in an airplane crash three days after the war ended. The first three chapters reveal Japanese military's intelligence activities

in Thailand and Malay prior to and during the Malay Operations. The intelligence agency known as the F Kikan, charged with the mission to win over Indian soldiers from British Indian forces, was headed by Major Fujiwara Iwaichi, a sincere and idealistic thirty-three year old staff officer of the Army General Staff. By the time the Japanese forces overran Singapore, Fujiwara and his agency staffed by six officers had succeeded in persuading tens of thousands of Indian soldiers to defect from the British forces. Fujiwara gave them an opportunity to fight for India's independence. Among the defectors was Captain Mohan Singh, who was to become the leader of the first INA, formally inaugurated at Singapore on February 12, 1942.

Ironically, the organization of the INA snarled relations between INA leaders and the Japanese military command in Tokyo (Chapters 4 through 6.) Mohan Singh, who from the time of his surrender had insisted on the independence of the INA from Japanese control, equality with the Japanese Army as an allied force, and recognition of the INA as a revolutionary army, was dissatisfied with the leadership of Rash Behari Bose, the leader of the Indian Independence League (IIL), which the Japanese had supported before the INA was organized. Mohan Singh regarded R. B. Bose as a Japanese puppet who was so subservient to the Japanese military that he could not articulate the INA demands to the Japanese military central command. Factionalism within the IIL-INA alliance and personal jealousy plagued Japanese-Indian relations. As Professor Lebra correctly points out, the deteriorating relations between the Army Central Command and the INA was the result of Japanese policy toward India and of disagreement between the two as to the role of the INA in the larger military consideration. Japan had viewed India as only a peripheral member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and had

conceived no invasion plans until the fall of 1942, and then only to be quickly cancelled. Furthermore, the Japanese attitude toward the INA was that the latter's support would provide a convenient bulwark to Japanese propaganda, particularly in fostering anti-British sentiment in Southeast Asia and India. Lastly, the Japanese military did not want to see the INA develop into a large fighting force because of the problems of equipping such an army and of its unproven quality as a fighting unit. Japanese policy was to develop the INA into an intelligent guerilla network to defend Burma and the western border of the Great East Asia-Co-Prosperity Sphere. These Japanese objectives were evident in the reorganization of the F Kikan in the spring of 1942, when it was taken over by the Iwakuro Kikan, headed by Colonel Iwakuro Hideo, the founder of the Nakano Army Intelligence School and an espionage operation expert. Under Iwakuro, training programs for propaganda and sabotage missions behind enemy lines were expanded. Thereafter, it was only a matter of time before the two irreconcilable forces were to come into open conflict. Mohan Singh resigned his command in protest in December 1942, and was later taken into custody. Fujiwara, though sympathetic to Mohan Singh, was helpless, for the matter was out of his hands; only Tokyo could settle a question of such politico-military magnitude. Thus came the end of the first INA after only one year of existence.

The INA, however, was resurrected with the arrival (in Singapore from Germany via Tokyo) of the Netaji Suhbas Chandra Bose, whose charismatic personality and persuasive tongue captivated reluctant and skeptical Japanese leaders, including Premier Tojo Hideki. The Netaji's appearance in Singapore in July 1943 also resuscitated demoralized INA soldiers. The story of this second phase of the Japanese-Indian alliance, the Japanese military planning for Imphal, its execution, and the tragic demise of the INA as the result of the defeat is related in the rest of the book.

The importance of Bose to Japan was indicated by the establishment of the Hikari Kikan headed first by Col. Yamamoto Bin and later by Major-General Isoda Saburo as liaison officers between the Japanese govern-

ment and the Free India Provisional Government that the Netaji established. As Professor Lebra rightly argues, Bose was in part responsible for forcing the Japanese military to arrive at the decision to launch the ill-prepared and ill-fated Impha Operations in October 1944. The operations were as much political as military. The political nature was graphically revealed by General Kawabe Shozé, Commander of the Burma Area Army and an admirer of Bose, in the following passage, written when it was apparent that the Operations were a disaster: "The fate of Japan-India relations hinges upon the Operations, and I keep saying to myself that I shall commit a double suicide with Bose." Bose died in an airplane crash on his way to Russia after the war was over. Even after reasonable evidence has been established for his death, a legend persists in India today that Bose is still alive somewhere.

Professor Lebra weighed materials carefully and analyzed them judiciously in considering issues and policies involved. In so doing, the author has succeeded in putting the role of the INA and the Japanese in proper perspective. There are, unfortunately, numerous misprints and awkward sentences in the Japanese translation, though none is serious. Professor Lebra should be congratulated for having produced this valuable and handsome book. For the price of less than U.S. \$5.00, the book is a bargain. Those who do not read Japanese will be glad to know that an English edition of the book is to be published in the near future.

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A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui.

By HUGH D. R. BAKER. California: Stanford University Press, 1968. xiv, 237 pp. Glossary, Index, Figures, Maps, Tables, Illustrations. \$8.50.

This volume is an ethno-historical study of a lineage village in the New Territories. Professor Baker has produced an interesting interdisciplinary work utilizing interviews and participant-observation techniques familiar to anthropologists and also drawing heavily on local gazetteers, government reports, and lineage documents and memorabilia. He is thus able to follow the Liao lineage from their original